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A Comparative Analysis of the Chinese and
Indian FDI Regimes
Ajay Sharma*
Abstract
This article provides a comparative legal study of certain salient aspects
of the Chinese and Indian Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) regimes,
keeping in mind the differences in the constitutions and legal systems of
both countries. India is presently perceived by foreign investors as having
an uncertain regulatory environment as far as its FDI policy. However,
implementation is a concern, though the government seeks to attract huge
foreign investment, which is also viewed as a panacea to the mounting
current account deficit problem. On the other hand, China has shown a
consistent surge in FDI inflows in spite of its economic slowdown and
marked legal reforms in recent years. Are there takeaway lessons for India
from the merits (and demerits) of the Chinese Foreign Investment Regime?
Yes, India can certainly learn from China’s “national investment
policymaking,” though the benefits derived from this comparative study
can be mutual. This article also objectively critiques relevant existing
literature, revealing problems present in both FDI Regimes. 	
  

Introduction
Though China is currently far ahead of India in attracting Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI), both countries are ranked by Transnational
Corporations (TNCs) in the top prospective host economies for FDI for
the 2013-15 period1, first and third respectively. The question is how does
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India realize its potential as it emerges as one of the top FDI destination
countries? The solution can be explored from multiple perspectives:
economic, political and legal. In the competition for FDI, India should not
perceive China as a rival, indulging in a zero sum game. Instead, both
countries should regionally integrate to create a positive sum game,
benefitting Asia as a whole. Setting aside their political differences,
mutually beneficial economic gains can be realized by both emerging
countries. This article proposes to undertake a comparative analysis of
salient law and policy aspects of the FDI Regimes in China and India. The
comparisons will assess the differences in the constitutions and the legal
systems of both countries. A researcher cannot objectively critique
comparative laws without appreciating these fundamental differences.
Moreover, this article pertinently critiques certain existing literature on the
present topic.2 Currently, India is perceived as having an uncertain
regulatory environment as far as its FDI policy and its implementation is
concerned. This increases transaction costs and becomes detrimental to the
goal of the Indian Government to attract a large amount of FDI. It is
arguable that due to enhanced legal and political risks, with an unfriendly,
opaque, and uncertain legal and regulatory environment no host nation can
attract sustainable and considerable FDI flows, regardless of its
commercial and economic potential. Can there be lessons for India from
the merits (and demerits) of the Chinese Foreign Investment Regime? The
answer would vehemently be in the affirmative. India can certainly learn
from China’s “national investment policymaking,” leading to an enhanced
quantity and quality of FDI and translating into concrete economic gains
and spill-over effects. Like China, India could realize consistent surges in
FDI inflows in spite of economic slowdown, resulting in marked legal
reforms. However, the comparative law and policy analysis done in this
paper presents a learning opportunity for the Chinese scholars and
policymakers too.
I.

The 1982 Chinese Constitution and the Chinese Legal System

After Mao’s death in 1976, the open door reforms were initiated in
the Chinese Communist Party’s third plenum of the 11th Congress in 1978
under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, marking the end of the Proletarian
Cultural Revolution.3 These efforts resulted in the current 1982
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which is the “fundamental
http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/wir2013_en.pdf (last visited Jul 29, 2014)
(hereinafter WIR 2013).
2
See e.g., Rohit Sachdev, Comparing the Legal Foundations of Foreign Direct
Investment in India and China: Law and the Rule of Law in the Indian Foreign Direct
Investment Context, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 167 (2006) (hereinafter Sachdev).
3
See QIANFAN ZHANG, THE CONSTITUTION OF CHINA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 47-48
(2012) (hereinafter Zhang).
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law of the State and has supreme legal effect,” as per its preamble.4 The
principle of “democratic centralism” is at the center of the Chinese
institutional governance.5 The centrist element in administration requires
the central government to supervise and guide local authorities.6 Article
11, a radical provision in the Chinese Constitution, was amended several
times. The final amendment known as ”Amendment Fourth,” was
approved on March 14, 2004 by the 10th National People’s Congress
(NPC) at its 2nd Session, and Article 11 now reads:7
Individual, private and other non-public economies that
exist within the limits prescribed by law are major
components of the socialist market economy." "The State
protects the lawful rights and interests of the non-public
sectors of the economy such as the individual and private
sectors of the economy. The State encourages, supports and
guides the development of the non-public sectors of the
economy and, in accordance with law, exercises
supervision and control over the non-public sectors of the
economy."8
Moreover, Article 11 should be read in conjunction with the
mandate in Article 13. After being amended in 2004, Article 13 now
reads:
Citizens' lawful private property is inviolable . . . "The
State, in accordance with law, protects the rights of citizens
to private property and to its inheritance" . . . "The State
may, in the public interest and in accordance with law,
expropriate or requisition private property for its use and
4

See CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (adopted on Dec. 4, 1982),
available at: http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Jul
29, 2014) (hereinafter CHINESE CONSTITUTION); id. at 50. The Chinese Constitution is a
unitary constitution.
5
Zhang, supra note 3, at 50-51.
6
See CHINESE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at Art. 3 (reading inter alia “The division of
functions and powers between the central and local state organs is guided by the principle
of giving full play to the initiative and enthusiasm of the local authorities under the
unified leadership of the central authorities.”); Zhang, supra note 3, at 51.
7
A careful comparison of the subsequent amendments with the previous ones and the
original provision, as expressed in English language, shows certain discrepancies; as the
original provision which has undergone amendment, as reproduced in some amendments
are inaccurately written. Thus, at least the English version of the Chinese Constitution
has discrepancies, which may not be there in the authoritative Chinese version; but due to
the language limitations of this researcher the one in Chinese cannot be read and
understood. CHINESE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4.
8 Id.
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shall make compensation for the private property
expropriated or requisitioned."9
However, the absence of qualifying adjectives like, “prompt,” “effective,”
“adequate,” and “just” may practically render this state obligation to pay
‘compensation’ pretty much useless. Yet this amendment was meant to be
a significant and welcome addition to the Chinese constitution in 2004.10
In another amendment to the Chinese Constitution of 1993, known
as “Amendment Two,” the reference to “state enterprises” in Article 16
was changed to “state-owned enterprises” which demonstrated recognition
of separation between ownership and management which hitherto was in
the hands of the State. Furthermore, the Chinese Constitution also
emphasizes that China is in primary stage of socialism and “the basic task
of the nation is to concentrate its effort on socialist modernization in
accordance with the theory of building socialism with Chinese
characteristics.”11 These welcome and radical constitutional reforms in
China have caused some apparent internal inconsistencies and tensions
within the constitutional provisions; and despite these amendments, the
Chinese State and Constitution in essence remain authoritarian.12 The
Chinese Constitution and laws, which have not been very dynamic, have
often lagged behind the rapid social transformation in China. Accordingly,
a thesis of “benign violation” has been propounded, advancing the view
that under these circumstances some violations of the constitution and
laws should be tolerated and legitimized for their salutary societal effects
which otherwise would not be achieved.13 However, the continuing
economic reforms in China, though allegedly without “political check and
balances,” have widened the gulf of economic disparities between its
people. This has resulted in a growing accumulation of wealth in the
hands of some at the expense of ordinary people’s livelihood and
sometimes even lives.14 This undesirable by-product of economic
progress, as a result of China moving towards a socialist (market)
economy, has caused tremendous pressure on the Chinese government to
advance “maintenance of stability” and “social harmony” in the country.15
In essence, there are four levels of governance in China: the central
government; the provinces; the cities and counties; and townships and
districts within cities.16 The size of the central government in China is not

Id.
See also Zhang, supra note 3, at 58.
11
See CHINESE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at Amend. 3.
12
See Zhang, supra note 3, at 60.
13
See id. at 61.
14
See id. at 73.
15
See id.
16
See CHINESE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at Art. 95; Zhang, supra note 3, at 82.
9

10
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very large because the local governments and villages are in charge of
implementing most regulations.17
The unitary framework of China’s central laws is unlimited in
competence and unconditionally superior to all local regulations.18 In fact,
local assemblies at any level can only pass “regulations,” as “law”-making
is in the exclusive domain of the national legislature.19 However some
conflicts arise between local legislations and rules enacted by the central
government, despite the unlimited superiority of the latter.20 Turning now
to the hierarchy of legal norms in China, the 1982 Constitution in its
preamble is declared to be the “fundamental law of the State and has
supreme legal effect,” designating it the apex of legal authority in China.21
According to Article 5 of the Chinese Constitution, “[n]o law or
administrative or local rules and regulations shall contravene the
constitution” and “[n]o organization or individual may enjoy the privilege
of being above the Constitution and the law.”22 Courts cannot apply or
enforce any constitutional provision in their decisions, and only the
standing committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) under
Article 67 of the Constitution has the power “to interpret the Constitution
and supervise its enforcement” and “to interpret the statutes.”23 In fact, the
Chinese Constitution is a kind of party manifesto “rather than an
instrument which is legally binding upon the organs of the State or which
may be legally enforced by an aggrieved individual.”24 One view claims
that the NPC is competent to exercise all powers of the State and “the
powers of the party in power are unlimited and if any of their acts be
tyrannical, there is no prospect of getting relief from an independent
judiciary.”25
The statutes enacted by the NPC or its standing committee form
the second tier of legal norms known as “laws.” There are no limits on the
scope of national legislation so long as it does not violate any
constitutional provisions.26 Below the “laws” are the administrative
directions enacted by the State council. An administrative regulation does
not grant, but rather limits, administrative powers.27 Further,
administrative regulations need not be pre-authorized by a “law,” and are

17

See Zhang, supra note 3, at 83-84.
See id. at 84.
19
See id.
20
See id.
21
CHINESE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4.
22
Id. at Art. 5.
23
See also Zhang, supra note 3, at 85; B M GANDHI, DR DURGA DAS BASU COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 133 (2 ed. 2008) (hereinafter Gandhi).
24
Gandhi, supra note 21, at 152.
25
Id. at 375.
26
See Zhang, supra note 3, at 85-86.
27
See id. at 86.
18
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deemed lawful unless they contravene any existing legal provisions.28
However, the structure of the level below administrative regulations
becomes somewhat obfuscated when one looks at the local regulations
enacted by the provincial Local People’s Congresses (LPCs) and
departmental rules made by Ministries and Commissions under the State
Council.29 In fact, Article 82 of P.R.C. Legislation Law (LL),30 amended
in 2000, equates the effects of rules of departments and rules of local
government, though confining their application “to their respective limits
of authority.” Below this level exists the lowermost, but arguably most
pragmatic, tier of legal order. This level is comprised of a massive body
of “normative documents,” made by a variety of governmental units at all
levels and executed with great swiftness and zeal, such as: orders;
decisions; notices; and instructions of general applicability.31 Actually,
these “normative documents”’ are the Chinese version of “red tape.”32
Unfortunately, despite China’s “Regulation on Disclosures of Government
Information,” passed in 2007 and requiring publication of all
documentation, in practice many of such orders are not published in
accordance with the regulation.33 However, it is alleged, that the laws
considered to be at the top of the hierarchy of norms get paid lip service
and the above unpublished rules, made without public consultations and
often against public interest, are zealously enforced.34
Article 63 of the LL inter alia provides that:
[t]he people's congresses or their standing committees of
the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities
directly under the Central Government may, in light of the
specific conditions and actual needs of their respective
administrative areas, formulate local regulations, provided
that such regulations do not contradict the Constitution, the
laws and the administrative regulations. 35
China lacks a centralized mechanism for reviewing legality of legislation.
So to tackle the problems like “legislation fighting,’ LL was enacted in the
year 2000 in order to “define a complex hierarchy of reviewing
28

See id.
See id.
30
See LEGISLATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (ORDER OF THE
PRESIDENT NO.31), (2000)., promulgated on Mar. 15, 2000.
31
See Zhang, supra note 3, at 87.
32
See id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 98-99.
35 Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted by the third Sess. of the
Ninth Nat’l People’s Cong. on March 15, 2000 and promulgated by Order No. 31 of the
President of China on March 14, 2000) Art.63 (China).
29
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authorities.” As mentioned above, legislative review significantly limits
the scope of judicial review by completely precluding courts from
reviewing ”concrete administrative acts” and does not extend to ”abstract
administrative acts” such as laws, regulations, rules or any other normative
documents of general nature.36 The real problem in China is identified as
the executive’s failure to faithfully enforce the Constitution and laws, and
that “the governments often systemically practice a set of ‘latent rules,’
rules not found in open texts but formulated and carried out beneath what
appears on the surface, often without public knowledge.”37
This article now turns to the judicial system in China. The
Supreme People’s Court (SPC) is the highest court in China. Additionally,
each province, municipality and autonomous region possess a High Court
as well. Middle-level courts are present in cities which are divided into
districts; and basic-level courts exist in city districts, counties and cities
which have not been further divided into districts.38 The Chinese judiciary
is politicized and allegedly suffers from “Chinese judicial syndrome,”
which is an “interlocking combination of dysfunctional symptoms.”39
According to Prof. Zhang Qianfan of Peking University’s Law School, the
following are “dysfunctional symptoms” of “Chinese judicial syndrome”:
(1) local protectionism that seriously undermines the
uniformity of law; (2) overall low professional and moral
quality of judges, making them prone to corruption and
unfit for impartial administration of justice; (3)
bureaucratic management of the courts and political control
of the judges, which are at odds with the generally
recognized principle of judicial independence and
impartiality; and (4) the lack of adequate material
provisions (salary, funding and working conditions) for
effective functioning of the courts.40
There have been successive attempts to reform the Chinese judiciary over
the course of five-year outlines, beginning in 1999, which have established
varied results.41 Moreover, China has a long way to go in order to really
achieve constitutionalism, despite having a written constitution.
II.

36

Chinese FDI Legal Regime

See Zhang, supra note 3, at 95.
Id. at 98.
38
Id. at 181-182.
39
Id. at 186.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 188-94.
37
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The above background knowledge is required to objectively
compare the merits of the FDI regime in China, with that of India. Prior to
indulging in such broad comparisons, it is necessary to fully appreciate the
FDI regime of China. China uses the following four corporate vehicles for
FDI: Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (WFOEs), which are the most
popular mode of FDI; the two types of Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures
viz., the Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture (EJV) and the Chineseforeign Contractual Joint Venture (CJV); and lastly the more recent
Foreign Invested Company Limited by Shares (FICLS).42 The cross border
merger route is also available, and will be briefly discussed. It is worth
mentioning, that the governing laws in China were amended after its entry
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) to comply with the WTO
norms. Though the Chinese FDI Regime is pretty complex, one of its
distinguishing features, as seen above, is the creation and legal recognition
of separate standardized business vehicles specifically for FDI.43 The basic
feature of all FDI in China, through any of the above modes, is that
mandatory approval is required from the specified authorities, though the
time limits for approval applications of each mode are statutorily
prescribed.44
The “Law of People’s Republic of China on Chinese-foreign
Equity Joint Ventures” (EJV Law) which was the first law to govern
Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs), was originally promulgated in the
year 1979 and is still the governing law for EJVs. The EJV Law is quite
pithy, consisting of just 16 articles, though it’s elaborate Implementing
Regulation is made up of 105 articles.45 According to Article 4 of the EJV
Law, the EJV shall consist of a limited liability company (LLC), and the
42

See e.g., Hui Huang, The Regulation of Foreign Investment in Post-WTO China: A
Political Economy Analysis, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 185, 188 (2009) (hereinafter Huang);
and Jim Jinpeng Zhang & Jung Y. Lowe, Foreign Investment Companies Limited by
Shares: The Latest Chinese Organization for Major International Ventures, 21 NW. J.
INT’L. L. & BUS. 409 (2001) (hereinafter Zhang & Lowe).
43
See also Matthew Sweeney, Foreign Direct Investment in India and China: The
Creation of a Balanced Regime in a Globalized Economy, 43 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 207,
210 (2010) (hereinafter Sweeney).
44
Article 3 of the EJV Law prescribes a three month period for approval authorities to
arrive at their decision. Under Article 5 of the CJV Law, the same period is shortened to
45 days. Article 6 of the WFOE Law establishes a similar 90 day decision period. Law of
the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (Adopted at the
Second Sess. of the Fifth Nat’l People's Cong. on July 1, 1979 and promulgated by Order
No.7 of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Nat’l People's Cong. on July 8,
1979; amended according to the Decision on Amending the Law of the People's Republic
of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures made at the Third Sess. of the
Seventh Nat’l People's Cong. on April 4, 1990, and amended for the second time
according to the Decision on Amendment to the Law of the People's Republic of China
on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures adopted at the Fourth Sess. of the Ninth Nat’l
People's Cong. on March 15, 2001) (China) (hereinafter EJV Law).
45
See also Huang, supra note 42, at 188-89.
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proportion of investment contributed by the foreign investor in an EJV
“shall generally not be less than 25% of the registered capital” of the
EJV.46
Though the EJV Law does not restrict the maximum foreign
capital participation in an EJV, the same is restricted by the sectoral policy
as contained in the “Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment
Industries” (Catalogue) (as amended last in 2011). The Catalogue divides
“foreign investment industries” into the following categories: “encouraged
foreign investment industries,” “restricted foreign investment industries,”
and “prohibited foreign investment industries.” All other types of
industries not mentioned in the catalogue are “permitted investments.” In
these three non-prohibited categories, “encouraged,” “permitted,” and
“restricted,” there is an increasing degree of pace and complexity in the
approval process and considerable variance in designated approval
authorities, depending on the monetary value of investment.47 The
Catalogue also places restrictions on the form of business associations, to
the above four categories, in certain sectors. For example, under the
“encouraged foreign investment industries”’ list under the “mining and
quarrying industries”’ for the “venture prospecting and exploitation of
petroleum, natural gas” the only forms of FIE prescribed are EJV or a
Contractual Joint Venture.48
Article 5 of the EJV Law imposes the following condition: “The
technology and the equipment that serve as a foreign joint venture's
investment must be advanced technology and equipment that actually suit
our country's needs. If the foreign joint venture causes losses by deception
through the intentional use of backward technology and equipment, it shall
pay compensation for the losses.”49 This condition is quite unique. Though
Article 10 does not impose export obligations on an EJV, it “encourages”
them. Article 15 of the EJV Law imposes upon the parties of an EJV to
attempt resolving their disputes compulsorily first through consultation,
and if that fails, through mediation or arbitration.50 If the parties are
unable to reach an arbitration agreement, the dispute is to be resolved
through the courts.51 In the case of expropriation of an EJV, pursuant to
legal procedure in social public interest, the state under Article 2 will offer
“corresponding compensation.”52 Additionally, a business license has to
46

See EJV Law, supra note 44, at Art. 4.
FRANÇOISE NICOLAS, CHINA AND FOREIGN INVESTORS: THE END OF A BEAUTIFUL
FRIENDSHIP? (IFRI) 8 (2008).
48
See Entry II.(2), Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries
(Amended in 2011)(Ministry of Commerce, China “MOFCOM”), available at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/aaa/201203/20120308027837.shtml
(last visited Dec. 6, 2014).
49
EJV Law, supra note 44, at Art. 5..
50
Id. at Art. 15.
51
Id.
52
Id. at Art. 2.
47
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be obtained before commencing business as a EJV.53 One successful
example of an EJV was carried out by Volkswagen, a well-known German
Auto TNC, in 1984 for a term of 25 years (which was extended to 2030 in
the year 2002).54
The Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures Law (CJV Law)
was promulgated in the year 1988, and has also undergone successive
amendments like the EJV Law.55 A different set of elaborate CJV
Implementing Regulations of 1995 are in existence. The broad objective
of the CJV Law, similarly to the EJV Law, is in form of an enactment
contained in its Article 1, which reads as follows:
This Law is formulated to expand economic cooperation
and technological exchange with foreign countries and to
promote the joint establishment, on the principles of
equality and mutual benefit, by foreign enterprises and
other economic organizations or individuals (hereinafter
referred to as the foreign party) and Chinese enterprises or
other economic organizations (hereinafter referred to as the
Chinese party) of Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint
Ventures (hereinafter referred to as contractual joint
ventures) within the territory of the People's Republic of
China.56
A CJV gives more flexibility to the parties in comparison to an
EJV. The EJV Law statutorily prescribes sharing of profits, risks and
losses between the parties to the EJV in proportion to the respective
capital contributions, whereas the CJV Law allows the parties to
determine proportions by the CJV contract. Though state protection to the
lawful interests of the joint venture and its partners are statutorily
extended in both the laws, Article 3 of the CJV Law explicitly places the
CJV under the supervision of the “relevant state authority.”57 Further,
Article 11 explicitly states, inter alia, that: “The right of a contractual joint
venture to make its own operational and managerial decisions shall not be
free from any interference.”58 In Article 4, the State encourages export
oriented or technologically advanced CJVs, though the above rigorous
requirement in the Article 5 of the EJV Law is absent.59 Article 25 of the
53

Id.
See Huang, supra note 42, at 192.
55
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures
(Adopted at the First Sess. Of the Seventh Nat’l People’s Cong. on April 13) (China)
(hereinafter ‘CJV Law’).
56
Id. at Art. 1.
57
Id. at Art. 3.
58
Id. at Art. 11.
59
Id. at Art. 4.
54
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CJV Law contains its dispute resolution provision for the joint venture
parties, and is similar to the EJV Law provision discussed above.60
However, consultations between parties are not even mandatory if the
parties cannot agree, and in certain cases the dispute can go straight to
litigation.61 One important distinction between the two laws is, even
though an EJV is specifically required to be a LLC, a CJV may or may not
be in a form of a company, though it is undoubtedly a separate “Chinese
legal person.”62 A CJV must obtain a similar business license, and the date
of issue is considered to be the date of establishment of the CJV.63
To establish a Chinese-foreign joint venture three levels of
approvals are needed:
(1) a preliminary approval by the government department
supervising the local Chinese enterprise, (2) final approval
by the PRC authorities with jurisdiction over foreign trade
and economic planning, and (3) the issuance of a business
license by the appropriate government entities with
authority over the regulation of industry and commerce. 64
Joint ventures gained popularity among foreign investors as a way
to counteract their own inexperience and unfamiliarity with the Chinese
business and regulatory system, by obtaining a Chinese partner who
possessed familiarity and experience with the Chinese business and
regulatory environment.65 However, gradually the popularity of joint
ventures declined and WFOEs became the most popular vehicle of FDI.
The reasons behind the decline in popularity of Chinese-foreign joint
ventures are two-fold, including conflicts of interests and business
priorities between the Chinese and the foreign partner. For example, the
local partner usually wanted quick dividends, but the foreign investing
partner sought to reinvest earnings back in the joint ventures business.66
Secondly, the local partner often used the technology the foreign partner
brought to the joint venture to manufacture its own products, and saw
nothing wrong with it, while the foreign partner viewed this
misappropriation of technology as a breach of trust.67
WFOEs are governed by the “Foreign-Invested Enterprise Law of
PRC on Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise” (WFOE Law) which was
60

Id. at Art. 25.
Id.
62
See EJV Law, supra note 44; CJV Law, supra note 55.
63
CJV Law, supra note 55.
64
DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 528–29 (2005) (hereinafter Chow).
65
Id. at 526.
66
Id. at 554-55.
67
Id.
61
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originally promulgated in 1986.68 The WFOE Law also has a set of
implementing regulations brought into force in 1990.69 Article 3 makes
clear that a WFOE must benefit the development of the Chinese economy
and that the State encourages establishment of export oriented WFOEs and
the use of advanced technology.70 Furthermore, as stipulated by the State
Counsel, certain lines of businesses are prohibited for WFOEs.
Expropriation and compensation provisions are similar to the EJV Law
discussed above. Similarly, per Article 7 of the WFOE Law, after
obtaining a certificate of approval, within 30 days the WFOE shall apply
to “industrial and commercial administrative authorities” to obtain a
business license.71 The WFOE Law does not contain a dispute resolution
clause.
The last foreign investment vehicle which remains to be discussed
is the Foreign Invested Company Limited by Shares (FICLS). FICLS are
regulated by a 1995 Law called, “The Provisional Regulations on the
Establishment of Foreign-Funded Joint Stock Companies Limited”
(FICLS Regulations).72 This law allows “foreign shareholders” to jointly
set up foreign funded joint stock companies with the “Chinese
shareholders.” Both classes of “shareholders” can be “companies,
enterprises and other economic entities or individuals,” foreign or
Chinese, as applicable.73 According to Article 5 there are two alternative
means of establishing a FICLS: “promotion”’ (involving, at least one
foreign promoter) and “public offer,” whose eligibility norms are
established in the second paragraph of Article 6.74 The minimum
registered capital required for setting up a FICLS is RMB 30 million
Yuan, with the total value of the shares purchased and held by the foreign
shareholders consisting of no less than 25% of the company's total
68

Law on Wholly Foreign- Owned Enterprises (Adopted at the fourth Sess. Of the Sixth
Nat’l People’s Congress on April 12, 1986, revised on October 31, 2000 at the 18th
Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Nat’l People's Cong. by the Decision on
Revision of the "Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Enterprises with Sole
Foreign Investment) (China) (hereinafter WFOE Law).
69
Id.
70
Sachdev, supra note 2 at 208 (“In reality, pursuant to the WFOE Articles 3 and 6, a
WFOE application will face tough examination prospects unless it encourages the
development of China's national economy through one of the following (or related)
methods: adoption of advanced technology and equipment; development of new
products; production of import substitutes; or exportation of at least fifty percent of
annual output. While the government has relaxed the approval procedures in practice,
especially in non-crucial industries, the approval process is still more restrictive than that
regulating joint ventures.”)
71
WFOE Law, supra note 68, at Art. 7.
72
Provisional Regulations on the Establishment of Foreign-Funded Joint Stock
Companies Limited (Promulgated by Decree No. 1 of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation on January 10, 1995) (China) (hereinafter ‘FICLS Law’).
73
See id. at Art. 1; and Zhang & Lowe, supra note 42.
74
FICLS Law, supra note 72, at Art. 5-6.
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registered capital.75 The approval process for both the aforementioned
means to set up a FICLS is delineated in Article 9 of the FICLS
Regulations.76 The FICLS Regulations also establish requirements and
procedure to be followed for conversion of foreign funded joint ventures,
WFOEs, and FICLS. FICLSs do not enjoy tax exemptions or tax
deduction preferences which are available to joint ventures and WFOEs
under domestic law.77 All regulatory filings are done in Chinese.
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) though very popular modes of
cross border investments globally, are not very popular among foreign
investors investing in China. The law governing M&As is the “Provisions
on the Takeover of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors,” enacted in
2006. The law deals with two types of M&As: “Equity M&As” and
“Asset M&As.” This article does not seek to focus on the Chinese M&A
law, and thus does not explore the Chinese M&A regime further.78
III.

Comparing Chinese FDI Regime with the Indian one: the
Analysis and Lessons (with a critique of Sachdev and
Sweeney):

This part of the article focuses on broadly comparing the Chinese
and the Indian FDI Regimes and drawing some lessons from this
comparative exercise.79 For this academic exercise, apart from having
recourse to the preceding information and analysis, the author will use two
pertinent articles which indulge in a similar comparative exercise. The
articles were published in the years 2006 and 2010, with the latter relying
on the former. The first article is by Rohit Sachdev80 and the second article
75

Id. at Art. 7.
Id. at Art. 9.
77
Id. at Art. 26.
78
See Hui Huang, China’s New Regulation on Foreign M&A: Green Light or Red Flag?,
30 UNSW LAW JOURNAL 802 (2007) (providing a detailed analysis of Chinese M&A
law).
79
See Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, Diapositives versus Movies – The Inner Dynamics
of the Law and its Comparative Account,
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 3, 3–4 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012) (stating
emphatically that: “[n]owadays, much literature is produced by scholars who take a quick
look at non-domestic legal systems, and thereby present their studies as comparative,
while their analysis remains embedded in the positive law paradigm.” The author leaves
it to his readers to determine whether this article is able to portray some elements of a
standard ‘comparative’ law work or not); H. Patrick Glenn, Aims of Comparative Law,
ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 57, 57–65 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006); Luke
Nottage, Commercial Regulation, ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 135,
135–45 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006).; Jens C. Dammann, The Role of Comparative Law in
Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, ST. THOMAS L. REV. 513 (2002); JAAKKO
HUSA, ABOUT THE METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW—SOME COMMENTS
CONCERNING THE WONDERLAND (MAASTRICHT WORKING PAPERS) (2007).
80
See Sachdev, supra note 2.
76
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is by Matthew Sweeney.81 This chapter does not endorse all the views
expressed in these articles. In fact, to the contrary, it will indulge in a
constructive criticism of some of the prominent views expressed in these
articles, and challenge certain inferences drawn therein.
Sachdev states in his article that, “India's statutory governance of
FDI is comparatively more convoluted and more antiquated than China's,
and therefore, it is less conducive to attracting, processing, and retaining
FDI inflows.”82 This article refutes such a claim. The current Indian FDI
statutory regime is based on the Foreign Exchange Management Act of
1999 (“FEMA”) and its pertinent regulations, particularly the Foreign
Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person
Resident outside India) Regulations of 2000 (commonly referred to as
“FEMA 20” from its notification number). Even the government of India
attempts to provide the FDI Policy in one place through its Consolidated
FDI Policy, the current version of which has become recently available in
April 2014. As far as “antiquity” is concerned, the basic laws and
regulations governing Chinese FDI are older than their Indian counterparts
and are not amended and updated as frequently as the Indian ones.
However, it is true that sometimes too frequent amendments in laws cause
an element of uncertainty in the regulatory environment, which is
undesirable in policy formulation and implementation. These frequent
policy changes also sometimes cause undesirable law and policy gaps.
As far as Sachdev’s claim that India's governance of FDI is more
“convoluted” than China’s, in my objective assessment, it is difficult to
state which of the two legal regimes is more convoluted. The drafting of
the Indian FDI Policy and Regulations appear to be better than their
Chinese counterparts. The claim that the Indian laws are more
“convoluted” is probably based on the assumption drawn from the article’s
next sentence, which reads as follows: “[i]n addition, China uses distinct
legal vehicles that prove more transparent and more comprehensible for
foreign investors than India's outdated legislation.”83 As discussed above,
the author fails to prove that Indian FDI Legislation is either antiquated or
outdated. The fact that “China uses distinct legal vehicles,” as discussed
above, does not prove his claim. In fact, the Chinese FDI Regime provided
for these standardized foreign investment vehicles not in foreign investors’
interests, but rather to protect its own interests. The Chinese FDI Regime
was skeptical of permitting and liberalizing FDI, so it created these
statutes from the scratch in a “piecemeal ad hoc” manner, while carrying
out its economic reforms through trial-and-error and allowing the
government to roll them back if and when the measures do not succeed.84
81

See Sweeney, supra note 43.
See Sachdev, supra note 2, at 169.
83
Id.
84
See Huang, supra 42 , at 203-204
82
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Actually, there are inconsistencies in the Chinese FIE laws.85 In fact,
despite the efforts of the authorities to resolve conflicts between the
Chinese Company Law and FIE Regime, which are supposed to
supplement and complement each other, whenever both apply, certain
conflicts remain particularly due to certain difficulties in interpreting
administrative opinions, decisions and decrees issued for this purpose.86
The second statement made by Sachdev which deserves comment
states as follows: “China, on the other hand, has a vertically integrated
FDI approval process, which generates significant tension between state
and national authorities but is nevertheless comparatively more facilitative
of FDI inflows.”87 As far as foreign exchange control laws and FDI Policy
in India is concerned, both of them are made at the national level, and not
at the state level. Even the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB),
whose clearance becomes indispensible for the sectors/activities falling
under the “government route” as per the Indian FDI Policy, comes under
the Central Government’s Ministry of Finance. As far as local or state
level clearances are required, only the competent authorities can give
them. Similarly, when an FDI deal in India triggers the Takeover Code
(administered by the Securities and Exchange Board of India), the
Companies Act provisions, or the Competition Act provisions
(administered by the Competition Commission of India), the same have to
be complied with, and the requisite regulatory approvals sought. In fact,
when seeking approval for FDI per se, there is no three-layered structure
in India as in China. Most of the sectors/activities open for FDI in India
now fall under the “automatic route” and require no prior approval from
the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)/Government, only subsequent reporting.
The differences in the Chinese unitary system and the Indian federal
system must be kept in mind when comparing the two regimes, and an
author’s preference for one over the other may be very subjective.
The third statement in Sachdev that merits response reads as
follows:88
This analysis reveals that a country's (in this case, China's)
disregard of the “rule of law” in political governance may,
ironically, allow it more effectively (1) to grant rule of law
protections to investors and (2) to implement more efficient
approval processes than a country such as India, which
preserves rule of law at the highest levels of governance,
yet at the expense of streamlined FDI statutory governance
and approval procedures. As a result, China can tailor more
effectively its FDI governance to foreign direct investors'
85

See id. at 204.
See id. at 209-12
87
Sachdev, supra 2, at 169.
88
Id. at 169-70.
86
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interests and assist them in circumventing red tape and
procedural delay.
The above statement suggests that “rule of law” is antithetical to an
efficacious FDI regime, which this article disputes. In fact, in international
investment law, the standard of protection that has dramatically arose to
prominence is the “Fair and Equitable Treatment” (FET) Standard, which
draws upon the host state’s capability to maintain “rule of law.”89 It has
been proposed that the “rule of law,” embodied in different municipal
legal systems, which aspires to “subject public power to legal control,”
can be a standard for explaining the normative content of FET.90
The following seven sub-elements emerge from the arbitral case
91
law: (1) the requirement of stability, predictability, and consistency of
the legal framework; (2) the principle of legality; (3) the protection of
legitimate expectations; (4) procedural due process and denial of justice;
(5) substantive due process and protection against discrimination and
arbitrariness; (6) transparency; (7) the principle of reasonableness and
proportionality. Some elaboration on some of these sub-elements is
necessary. Legal security and legal certainty, which are derived from the
“rule of law” concept, are associated with domestic law and corresponds
to sub-element (1) above.92 There are limits to this sub-element, as foreign
investors are not excluded from the regulatory changes taking place in the
host state.93 Thus, a foreign investor needs to do investment planning and
adjust itself to the host state's legal framework.94 On the sub-element (2)
pertaining to “legality,” the domestic actors compliance with national laws
is used as a basis for assessment of FET.95 The sub-element (3) relates to
“legitimate expectations,” which can arise from the general framework's
provisions of the host state.96
As far as the existence of red-tape is concerned, as discussed
above, a lot of red-tape orders are passed by the Chinese authorities and
remain unpublished.97 It is unfortunately true that undesirable bureaucratic
corruption and red-tape exists in the Indian system too, which, in absence
of any evidence, may or may not have attributed to the delays in approval
89

See generally, Stephen W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, The Rule of Law, and
Comparative Public Law,
INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
LAW
AND
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW (Stephen W. Schill ed., 2010).
90
Id. at 158–59.
91
Id. at 159-60.
92
Id. at 161.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 162. For example, in Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID 12/10/2005, the tribunal
relied on observance of domestic legal rules to decline violation of FET.
96
Schill, supra note 89, at 165.
97
See supra note 33 and accompanying text
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and implementation process in foreign investment deals.98 However, the
preciseness and certainty in FDI law and policy, and its implementation by
the regulators whose regulatory space is well delineated and without
overlaps and without any regulatory overreach, is much desired in the
Indian FDI Regime.99 The professional, competent and independent
Judiciary in India, with a large number of competent, able assisting
corporate lawyers, is not bad for foreign investors; it actually increases the
effectiveness of the legal system, which is one of the important
determinants in attracting FDI in a host state.100
The numerous problems in the Chinese judicial system have been
discussed above, and Sachdev is not oblivious to them.101 Furthermore, the
High Courts in India and its Supreme Court have the efficacious power of
judicial review over both the legislation and the administrative law. In
somewhat contradistinction to its Chinese counterparts, as discussed
above, this judicial review is also available to the foreign invested Indian
entities, and to the foreign investors as well, to challenge these laws and
administrative actions.102 These Indian courts can effectively address
violations of constitutional provisions, providing suitable reliefs to the
aggrieved persons. Despite this, though, it is also correct that the Indian
courts are overburdened with work, and the extreme docket pressure
sometimes leads to inordinate delays in disposal of cases, with undesirable
results for both India as a host state and for the affected foreign
98

See, e.g., T.R. SAREEN & S.R. BAKSHI, 3 SOCIO-ECONOMICS & POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA 124–61.
99
See Ajay Kr. Sharma, A Critique of the Indian FDI Law and Policy: Problems &
Solutions, 2 NLUJ LAW REVIEW 30, 54–55 (2013) (hereinafter Sharma).
100
See Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Finding and Facing Facts about Legal Systems and
Foreign Direct Investment in South Asia, 23 LEGAL STUD. 649, 668–69 (2003)
(establishing that the Indian courts were most 'effective' when compared to the ones in
Bangladesh, Pakistan, the UK and the US; suggesting a locational advantage for India in
this respect for attracting FDI)..
101
See Sachdev, supra note 2, at 184-85.
102
See M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 461–505 (5 ed. 2003); DR. JUSTICE A R
LAKSHMANAN, A R MANOHAR & JUSTICE BHAGABATI PROSAD BANERJEE, 2 DURGA DAS
BASU SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1185–1361; 1379–1458 (14 ed.) (discussing the
powers of the Indian High Courts to issue certain writs including, writ of mandamus);
T.R. Andhyarujina, The Evolution of Due Process of Law by the Supreme Court,
SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIABLE 193, 193–213 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000); I. P.
MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 283–434 (7 ed. 2008) (discussing inter alia both the
principles and modes of judicial review of administrative action in India); S.P. SATHE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 51–112, 216–296 (1999); JUSTICE G. P. SINGH & JUSTICE ALOK
ARADHE, MP JAIN & SN JAIN: PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 584–688 (6 ed.
2010) (discussing inter alia at length judicial control of administrative action and judicial
control of administrative discretionary powers in India including in cases of abuse of
discretion involving mala fides and exercise of power on irrelevant considerations);
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT (GOVERNMENT OF INDIA)
58–59 (2010) (discussing the importance of judicial review as an important part of rule of
law for reasons of accountability, fairness and participation).
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investor.103 These merits in the Indian Legal and Judicial system should
not be undermined when comparing the Chinese and Indian regimes,
though the systemic problems should be tackled institutionally for both
investment promotion and efficacious protection.
Before proceeding further, a comparative table below presents
comparisons between China and India on some indicators used by
Transparency International (TI) (including some borrowed ones) to
measure inter alia corruption, transparency and governance standards,
with author’s inferences:104
Table: Comparisons of China with India on TI Indicators

103

Indicator
(ref. year)

Explanation of
the indicator

Corruption
Perception Index
(2014)

“The Corruption
Perception
Index ranks
countries/territori
es based on how
corrupt a
country’s public
sector is
perceived to be.
It is a composite
index, drawing
on corruptionrelated data from
expert and
business surveys
carried out by a
variety of
independent and
reputable
institutions.
Scores range
from 0 (highly
corrupt) to 100
(very clean).”

Performance
China
RANK:
100/174

India
RANK:
85/174

SCORE:
36/100

SCORE:
38/100

Author’s
Inferences
In comparison to
the 2013 Index, the
position of India
has significantly
improved to 85
from 94, whereas
the position of
China has
drastically fallen by
20 places from 80
to 100. In fact. there
is complete reversal
of ordering from the
last year’s tally.
India now leads
China by 2 percent
by improving its
score by 6 percent.
This casts doubts
over the efficacy
over the Chinese
policy to tackle
corruption
concerning both
“tigers and flies”;
though significant
scope for
improvement exists

See White Industries Australia Ltd. v. Republic of India, 2011 UNCITRAL, Final
Award (Nov. 30).
104
See Transparency International (Accountability) for India,
http://www.transparency.org/country#IND (last visited Dec. 7, 2014); Transparency
International (Accountability) for China, http://www.transparency.org/country#CHN (last
visited Dec. 7, 2014).
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Open
Budget
Index
(2010)
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“Control of
corruption reflect
s perceptions of
the extent to
which public
power is
exercised for
private gain.
This includes
both petty and
grand forms of
corruption, as
well as "capture"
of the state by
elites and private
interests. Point
estimates range
from about -2.5
to 2.5. Higher
values
correspond to
better
governance
outcomes.”
“The Open
Budget Index
assesses the
availability in
each country of
eight key budget
documents, as
well as the
comprehensivene
ss of the data
contained in
them.
It also examines
the extent of
effective
oversight
provided by
legislatures and
supreme audit
institutions, as
well as the
opportunities
available to the
public to
participate in
national budget
decision-making
processes. Scores

RANK:
percentile
33%

RANK
percentile
36%

SCORE:
0.60302871
2

SCORE:
0.51671917
2

BUDGET
OPENNESS:
Scant or
none

BUDGET
OPENNESS:
Significant

SCORE:
13

SCORE:
67

Vol.

for India as well.
The authenticity of
this indicator is
more, as it used and
measured by the
World Bank to
calculate ‘World
Governance
Indicators’, being
one of its six
dimensions. On this
indicator India
scores better than
China, though only
marginally, by three
percentiles.

Here, Indian score
is significantly
higher than the
Chinese. A more
‘open budget’
shows at least
greater transparency
in fiscal policy
making which is
good for foreign
investors.
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range from 0
(scant or no
information) to
100 (extensive
information).” A
more elaborate
classification
into different
categories on
basis of the said
scores is also
done.
“Judicial
Independence is
an indicator in
the Global
Competitiveness
Index produced
by the World
Economic
Forum.
It measures the
perceived extent
in which the
judiciary of the
country is
independent
from influences
of members of
government,
citizens, or firms.
Scores range
from 1 (heavily
influenced) to 7
(entirely
independent).”

“This dimension
captures
perceptions of
the extent to
which agents
have confidence

RANK:
63/142

RANK:
51/142

SCORE:
3.9/7

SCORE:
4.3/7

RANK:
percentile
45%

RANK:
percentile
55%

SCORE:
-

SCORE:
-

Vol.

A 5.71 per cent
difference in the
‘judicial
independence’
indicator between
the Chinese and the
Indian judiciary
does not appear to
be too significant
and alarming.
However, the
researcher’s above
claims based on the
doctrinal research,
and on basis of his
personal experience
as an Indian
Lawyer, currently
an academic, and in
past as a practising
Advocate and a
Judge makes him
doubt this marginal
difference. The
constitutional
differences,
discussed above,
themselves show
much difference in
the judicial powers
and autonomy of
the superior courts
in both countries as
far as powers of
judicial review are
concerned alone.
On this indicator
India significantly
leads China. The
anticipated benefits
of ‘rule of law’ for
foreign investors

21
XV

Voice &
Accountab
ility
(2010)

Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.

Vol.

in and abide by
the rules of
society, and in
particular the
quality of
contract
enforcement,
property rights,
the police, and
the courts, as
well as the
likelihood of
crime and
violence.
Rule of Law is
one of the six
dimensions of
Worldwide
Governance
Indicators. Point
estimates range
from about -2.5
to 2.5. Higher
values
correspond to
better
governance
outcomes.”

0.34683992
3

0.05776936
4

have been discussed
above.

“Voice and
Accountability c
aptures
perceptions of
the extent to
which a country's
citizens are able
to participate in
selecting their
government, as
well as freedom
of expression,
freedom of
association, and
a free media.
Control of
corruption is one
of the six
dimensions of
the Worldwide
Governance
Indicators. Point
estimates range
from about -2.5
to 2.5. Higher

RANK:
percentile
5%

RANK:
percentile
59 %

SCORE:
1.6495012
1

SCORE:
0.42402758

As expected due to
the differences in
the forms of
governments
between the two
countries, China
scores poorly on
this indicator,
whereas India,
being a robust
democracy, scores
reasonably well.
This difference per
se is beneficial for
India as a FDI
destination.
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values
correspond to
better
governance
outcomes.”

Furthermore, it may also be incorrect to use the Chinese legal
regime as the basis for justification of the rapid and huge FDI inflow into
China compared to India, as there are several other determinants apart
from “market-friendly” and investment & investor friendly and
incentivizing policies which help in a host state becoming a magnet for
FDI, including economic and business-facilitative factors, good
infrastructure, and the state of existing and potential markets.105 It must
also be kept in mind that even Sachdev concedes that there may be
“round-tripping” to the extent of 50% of the FDI inflow reported by
China, but still the gap between India and China in receiving FDI is
considerable.106
Let us now scrutinize another of Sachdev’s statements: “First,
unlike in India's case, the Chinese government drafted FDI legislation by
breaking dramatically with past economic and legal policy, thereby
explicitly signaling to foreign investors China's desire for capital from
abroad. Second, the structural framework of Chinese FDI laws proves
relatively more transparent and user friendly than its Indian
counterpart.”107 And further, “FDI legislation seemingly retains fewer rule
of law elements than does its Chinese counterpart, which generally falls
far short of extending rule of law protections to its own citizens. India's
foreign investors must meander through a tangle of unclear and disjointed
rules, whereas China's investors are afforded clear rules, protections, and
rights, all embodied in the FIE vehicle of choice.”108 The 1991 Indian
Industrial Policy, though not completely and unnecessarily breaking from
the past, as FDI was permitted from a very long time in India, ushered in
the era of liberalization of foreign investment regime in India.
Subsequently, there have been numerous FDI law and policy reforms in
India until date, with mixed results.
Keeping in view the preceding submissions and the above discussion on
the Chinese FDI regime, it does not appear to be relatively dramatic from
the Indian standpoint, though it is indeed a dramatic reformation in China
which started off only in 1979. The clarity and inconsistencies in the
Chinese FDI Regime have already been commented on above. The
105

See UNCTAD WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2003: FDI POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, 86–87 (2003).
106
Sachdev, supra note 2, at 176.
107
Id. at 194.
108
Id. at 198.
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difficulty in understanding an alien legal regime for a foreign investor and
his home country’s corporate lawyers is indeed real. Thus, for effective
business transactions, the role of competent and efficient local legal
counsels, experienced in dealing in the regulatory due diligence and other
pertinent aspects relating to their national laws, cannot be undermined.
Complexities exist in both Indian and Chinese regimes, making it
terse to understand them holistically and wholesomely, and to connect the
dots among the assorted laws that may apply in a particular FDI deal. As
such, a simplistic comparison and inference as done by Sachdev, cannot
be practical. Sachdev subsequently states, that, “foreign investors are
offered certain legally guaranteed (via legislative decree) rights in China,
but only an administrative overseer in India.”109 It is true that the Chinese
FIE laws explicitly guarantee certain limited rights to the foreign investors
against certain state measures. On face of it, the absence of similar rights
in Indian FDI laws appears to be a relative deficiency. However, as
discussed above, the legal and constitutional rights and remedies are
available to the foreign investors to enforce them in the Indian courts of
competent jurisdiction. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, these statutory
and constitutional rights may not be efficaciously enforced in the Chinese
courts, though the Indian courts have been fair in adjudicating these claims
against the State.110 The other relevant criticisms, made earlier, equally
apply to this statement.
Similarly, this article refutes the claim of Sachdev that: “[t]he
IDRA is the current form of the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948,
which was passed upon independence more than fifty years ago with the
goal of granting the federal government the ability to direct and to control
industrial activities.”111 It is true that the Industries (Development and
Regulation) Act of 1951 (“IDRA”) is a regressive industrial licensing law
in India. But, as a result of the changes made in the 1991 Industrial policy
and subsequent reforms, most of the industries in India are now exempted
by the Central Government from the pertinent licensing provisions of the
IDRA, thus rendering the IDRA pragmatically redundant in most cases.
The above statement in Sachdev’s article is thus misleading. Furthermore,
the service sector is per se not covered under the IDRA. Another
objectionable statement made by Sachdev reads: “Due to the conspicuous
absence in India of Chinese-style, cookie-cutter legal vehicles for FIE
formation, foreign investors considering investment in India inevitably
confront less certainty and a more convoluted legal setting for investing.”
The accuracy of this claim is refuted on the basis of this article’s
preceding arguments.
109

Sachdev, supra 2, at 196.
See, e.g., Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India, 2012 1 Comp LJ
225 (SC) (a 3 Judge bench decision of the Supreme Court of India).
111
Sachdev, supra note 2, at 197.
110
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After appreciating the governance and constitutional differences
between the two countries, with one having a unitary structure and other
having a federal structure,112 it is not difficult to observe the chinks in the
following statement made by Sachdev: “The Chinese model formally
incorporates state and local governments, while the Indian model is
formally national and leaves foreign investors on their own to deal with
the state and local governments once national approval has been
granted.”113 No evidence is given about whether foreign investors in China
have to deal with the Chinese local authorities themselves, or whether the
centre facilitates their local clearances. However, in India, the “Foreign
Investment Implementation Authority,” under the Central Government’s
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), Ministry of
Commerce, exists to help foreign investors obtain necessary approvals at
both Central and State levels.114 Sachdev also criticizes the FIPB’s
working and compares it to the erstwhile Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) (now MOFCOM).115
Indeed, regardless of the comparisons, the FIPB needs to improve its
transparency and efficiency. Restoration of “guidelines for consideration
of FDI proposals by FIPB”116 in the Indian “consolidated FDI Policy”
would go a long way in this respect.
Lastly, one other statement made by Sachdev merits reaction. It
reads: “[a]pprovals in China are likely to stall at the national level, but
turnaround occurs much more quickly at the state and local levels.”117
112

See Jain, supra note 102, at 553–55; CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Art. 245, 246 (adopted
on Nov. 26, 1949), available at: http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/welcome.html (last visited
Dec. 2, 2014) (hereinafter Indian Constitution) (dealing with “extent of laws made by
Parliament and by the Legislatures of States” and “Subject matter of laws made by
Parliament and by the Legislatures of States” respectively).
113
Sachdev, supra note 2, at 208.
114
See Foreign Investment Implementation Authority (FIIA), DEPARTMENT OF
INDUSTRIAL
POLICY
AND
PROMOTION
(DIPP),
http://dipp.nic.in/English/Investor/FIIA.aspx (last visited Dec. 2, 2014) (which reads:
“Government of India has set up the Foreign Investment Implementation Authority
(FIIA) to facilitate quick translation of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) approvals into
implementation, to provide a pro-active one stop after care service to foreign investors by
helping them obtain necessary approvals, sort out operational problems and meet with
various Government agencies to find solution to their problems. Investors, facing any
type of difficulties on implementation of projects, are requested to make application in
the following proforma to the concerned authorities given in the Table below.”).
115
See Sachdev, supra note 2, at 209-10.
116
See e.g., DIPP Circular 2, Para. 4.7 (2010) (establishing such guidelines); and Sharma,
supra note 99, at 43-44.
117
Sachdev, supra note 2; see, REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT (GOVERNMENT OF INDIA) 22 (2002) (endorsing a 2001 A.T.
Kearney study itself states: “Despite a very similar historical mistrust of foreigners and
foreign investment arising from colonial experience, modern (post 1980 China) differs
fundamentally from India. Its official attitude to FDI, reflected from the highest level of
government (PM, President) to the lowest level of government bureaucracy (provinces) is
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Despite alleged excessive red-tape at the local level in China, if the
approvals do come at quick speed, it may be due to two probable
alternative reasons: either (1) with respect to FDI approvals, local
authorities display a radically different attitude contradicting their usual
approach or, (2) there are extraneous considerations involved in approval
process that are speeding up the approvals at that level, though the former
seems more likely.118 Though it is arguable that, after the Chinese
Ministry of Commerce promulgated measures for handling complaints by
FIEs and foreign investors in 2006, the efficiency of granting clearances
might have increased as a consequence.119 However, a close reading of
these measures show that the remedies which may be meted out by the
“complaint-accepting organ,” which focus on issuing suggestions and
facilitating coordination between the complainants and concerned
department, may not deter the erring officials enough to expedite the
process. An inducement of corruption to get the deals through may have
its own drastic consequences on foreign investors coming from a
developed capital exporting country. This is mostly due to their own
home-state laws, rather than the host-state’s laws dealing with corruption
in either China or India.120 Similar claims made elsewhere by Sachdev,
which mostly reiterate the above submissions, are not dealt with herein.
These criticisms are made purely in academic spirit, and do not display
any national bias towards India. Further, they do not undermine the
academic contribution of Sachdev.
Sweeney rightly recognizes that “India’s regime is arguably more
open” than China’s.121 In fact, the list of sectors that are prohibited for FDI
in India is considerably shorter than the Chinese “Catalogue of Prohibited
Foreign Investment Industries,” mentioned above. As far as the certainty
in the classification policy for industries in the “Catalogue” is concerned,
the Chinese policy has also been somewhat uncertain and changing, as
suggested by the categorizations and subsequent re-categorizations in
many sectors. Unlike the Indian FDI Policy, in China, the list of sectors
prohibited for FDI contains certain industries which were not prohibited
hitherto were added later on. For example, in the 2011 Catalogue, the real
estate industry was reclassified from a “restricted” to a “prohibited”

one of consciously enticing FDI with a warm welcome. They recognize the multifaceted
and mutual benefits arising from FDI.”) However, the reader will do well to keep in mind
that this report is more than a decade old, and much water has flown in the river Ganges
since 2002.
118
See Chow, supra note 64, at 10-11.
119
See PRC Ministry of Commerce, Decree No. 2 2006 (Oct. 1) (promulgating
Provisional Measures of the Ministry of Commerce on Handling Complaints Lodged by
Foreign-Invested Enterprises ).
120
See, e.g., Chow, supra note 64, at 448-55 (discussing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and its application on the US Corporations investing abroad).
121
Sweeney, supra note 43, at 210.
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category.122 However, while Sweeney’s analysis goes on so well, it
suddenly falters as soon as the author starts his comparative endeavor by
examining “differences between each regime.” Partly, Sweeney’s analysis
has to do with the reliance he places on Sachdev’s view that the Indian
FDI regime is “antiquated” and “convoluted” (as expressed and critiqued
above). It is important to note the following excerpt from Sweeney’s
analysis:123
Analytically, the differences can be divided between the
statutory structure of each regime, including the legal entity
used and the relevant governing regulations, and the
approval process necessary to consummate a foreign
investment. These differences go a long way toward
explaining the dramatic disparities in FDI inflows between
India and China and may better explain the current
disparity in investment inflows than other political and
economic explanations.
The statutory structure of China's investment regime, and
the context in which it was promulgated, provide investors
with greater predictability of government actions, is more
transparent and user-friendly, and by being tailored to FDI,
has signaled China's deep and lasting commitment to
attracting foreign investment. Rohit Sachdev summarizes
the differences:
“India's statutory governance of FDI is comparatively more
convoluted and more antiquated than China's… India's
outdated legislation.”
Investors are unlikely to make significant investments
unless they are provided some sense of certainty or
predictability in how a host nation will interpret its FDI
laws and whether it will respect the contractual rights and
property rights inherent in the investment. Absent a high
degree of confidence in the clarity, integrity, and stability
of investment rules, investors may exaggerate the dangers
inherent in a host nation's investment regime, resulting in
less investment than would otherwise be provided.
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See Clifford Chance, AN OVERVIEW OF THE LATEST CHANGES TO CHINA’S INDUSTRY
CATALOGUE
FOR
FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
CLIFFORD
CHANCE
(2012),
http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2012/01/an_overview_of_thelatestchangestochi
na.html/An-Overview-of-the-Latest-Changes-to-China’s (last visited Jul 29, 2014).
123
Sweeney, supra note 43, at 226-27.
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The arguments advanced above in respect of Sachdev’s similar views,
some of which are expressly relied on by Sweeney, can be put forth
against the above observations, so far as they criticize the Indian FDI
Regime in comparison to the Chinese. In India, though FDI in companies
registered under the Companies Act are the major concern of the FDI
Regime, FDI in other forms of business vehicles, like partnerships and
LLPs, is also conditionally allowed under the FDI Policy.124 Respective
laws regulate all forms of business associations in India. In China too, as
discussed above, the Chinese Companies Act applies to certain FIEs
along-with their governing laws. So, such assumptions and inferences on
lay comparisons between the two regimes are unjustified.
Another of Sweeney’s excerpts which merits response reads as
follows:125
Investors may be more confident in China's commitment to
attracting FDI than in India's efforts. First, investors may
view China as more likely than democratic India to
maintain consistent policy goals and objectives because of
China's long-term communist leadership. Or alternatively,
investors may have more confidence in a single party
regime to put into effect liberalizing reforms beneficial to
investors, which, in an open democracy, may be too
politically costly to enact. Second, China has explicitly and
actively sought to reform its investment regime to court
foreign investment in a way that signals a deep
commitment to attracting and maintaining high levels of
foreign investment. The sustainability of this commitment
to foreign investment may be furthered by the single-party
autocratic rule of China. Because there is less of a threat of
political change in China, there may be a perception that
the government is less likely to make an about-face and
curtail investment rights. China's FDI laws were formed
with the specific intention of attracting foreign investments
and were tailored to that end, beginning with the
promulgation of the EJV law following Deng Xiaoping's
"open door policy" of 1979. Soon thereafter, the Chinese
constitution was amended to more explicitly allow for
foreign investment.
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See Consolidated FDI Policy Circular of 2014, ¶ 3.2 (Dep’t of Industrial Policy and
Promotion (‘DIPP’), Min. of Commerce & Industry, Govt. of India, Apr. 17, 2014),
http://dipp.gov.in/English/Policies/FDI_Circular_2014.pdf (last visited Jul 29, 2014)
(hereinafter FDI Policy, 2014).
125
Sweeney, supra note 43, at 228.
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In fact, the above observations are amazing, if they offer explanation to
the Chinese FDI growth. Sweeney firmly believes that a democracy such
as India – keeping in mind the differences in ideologies amongst some
political parties with respect to permissibility and limits of FDI in certain
sectors – should provide a better overall investment environment when
compared to a single party autocratic and communist state like China.
Jensen (2003) and Busse (2004) show a positive association between
democratic rights and FDI inflows. Just because the Chinese constitution
and statutes explicitly give certain rights to the foreign investors, it does
not mean that pragmatically it will lead to a better sense of security to the
foreign investors and investment compared to India. The “rule of law” in a
robust democracy in India with several institutional checks and balances
gives a better guarantee and security to the foreign investment and
investors. Though, it must be kept in mind that both countries have signed
numerous Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), including the one in the
year 2006 between themselves, and so are obligated under these BITs to
the protected investor of the other contracting parties, who may enforce
their treaty rights in investment treaty arbitration.
The Indian government’s general policy towards FDI in its
country, regardless of the political parties forming the government, has
been investment and investors’ friendly, and is summed up at the very
onset under the “intent and objective” chapter of the country’s FDI policy
as:126
It is the intent and objective of the Government of India to
attract and promote foreign direct investment in order to
supplement domestic capital, technology and skills, for
accelerated economic growth. Foreign Direct Investment,
as distinguished from portfolio investment, has the
connotation of establishing a “lasting interest” in an
enterprise that is resident in an economy other than that of
the investor.
Though some of the observations, similar to that of Sachdev
(discussed above) are not discussed here, one of Sweeney’s observations
must be addressed, which reads:127
Additionally, India should re-evaluate industry specific FDI
restrictions. Some restrictions may make sense, considering
political and social differences. But as one commentator
points out, the specifics of some restrictions suggest a lack
126
127

See FDI Policy, 2014, supra note 125, at ¶ 1.1.1.
Sweeney, supra note 43, at 239-40.
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of careful deliberation: "Why, for example, does India
permit 100% FDI in the manufacture of hazardous
chemicals and industrial explosives, but 74% in telecoms,
26% in insurance and none at all in supermarkets?"
Though a good suggestion duly supported in this article, the illustration
cited from a view of a “commentator,” though apparently attractive, is not
really a cogent one. Permitting “100% FDI in the manufacture of
hazardous chemicals and industrial explosives” does not mean that
environmental and safety concerns are given a go by, as there are
municipal laws to take care of these aspects in domestic companies,
whether having FDI or not. This submission however does not amount to
an endorsement of the adequacy of the Indian legal regime in dealing with
any future tragic mass torts incidents by Multinational Enterprises
(MNEs), keeping in mind the Bhopal tragedy, despite the current laws
like, the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991. The lower limits in telecom
and insurance are because of the grave strategic and security concerns
involved therein, though they are apparently innocuous when compared to
the hazardous chemicals industry. In fact, in China the telecom sector
comes under the ‘restricted list’ in the catalogue and have much lesser
permissible foreign investment limits. The relevant entry in the 2011
Catalogue reads: “Tele communication companies: telecommunication
increment service (the foreign capital less than 50 percent), motion tone
and data service in basic telecom, interior business and international
business (the foreign capital less than 35 percent, 49 percent no later than
11th in December in 2007 is permitted).”
Notably, under the current 2014 Indian consolidated FDI Policy
the “telecom services” sector permits 100% FDI, with up to 49% under the
“automatic route.” In insurance sector too, despite much opposition, the
Indian government is seeking to enhance FDI limit to 49%.128 As far as the
comment regarding “supermarkets”, which pertains to the “multi brand
retail trading,” is concerned, currently FDI is conditionally permitted in
India in this sector up to 51%, but it is of course a contentious political and
policy issue in India. In China, retail industry dealing with distribution of
“grain, cotton, vegetable oil, sugar, medicines, tobaccos, automobiles,
crude oil, capital goods for agricultural production” falls within the
“restricted sector” in the 2011 Catalogue and the additional condition
imposed on it is that: “Chinese should hold the majority of shares of the
128

See Plan to hike FDI in insurance with cap on voting rights, THE HINDU, July 7, 2014,
http://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/plan-to-hike-fdi-in-insurance-with-cap-onvoting-rights/article6186828.ece (last visited Dec 7, 2014); see also Kavita Chowdhury,
Decks cleared for Insurance bill, if Parliament is not disrupted, BUSINESS STANDARD
INDIA, December 6, 2014, http://www.business-standard.com/article/economypolicy/decks-cleared-for-insurance-bill-if-parliament-is-not-disrupted114120600795_1.html (last visited Dec 7, 2014).

30
XV

Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.

Vol.

multiple shops which have more than 30 branch stores and sale different
kinds and brands of commodities from multi-suppliers.” The Chinese
foreign invested retail entities, which would be dealing in the other
commodities, would presumably be under the “permitted sector.” This
classification, though seemingly intended to protect indigenous sale of
certain (presumed) essential commodities, may create unnecessary
business hindrances for foreign invested retail enterprises. So, a Retail
FIE that intends to open a chain of supermarkets in China will have to
comply with the “restricted list” procedure and conditions. Otherwise, it
will not be able to sell some of the commonly sold items listed therein,
including vegetable oil, cotton, and sugar, with possible adverse business
consequences like losing many prospective customers.
Before concluding, some of the salient aspects of the Chinese FDI
Regime that may be considered by the policymakers for incorporation in
the Indian FDI regime can be succinctly stated as takeaway lessons. The
quality of the FDI, accompanied with technology transfer, and the
resultant “spillover effects,” can be important considerations for a
developing country. As seen above, the Chinese FIE Laws duly emphasize
upon these aspects. Without violating any international law obligation,
India can also consider incorporating a similar strategy in its FDI norms in
order to stress the quality of FDI with resultant spillovers for domestic
industry. Statutorily laid down time limits for deciding FDI proposal
applications in India are highly desirable, much like certain FIE regulatory
approvals under the Chinese regime. Though Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) is generally provided for under India’s Arbitration and
Conciliation Act of 1996, Indian law and policymakers would do well to
consider imposing prior mandatory consultations and conciliations in
order to resolve disputes involving foreign investors and their Indian JV
partners (or Indian shareholders) before the matter goes for arbitration or
litigation. A last suggestion that Indian policymakers should consider is to
set up dedicated complaint centers for handling complaints by entities with
FDI and the foreign investors against the administrative officials, as
discussed above and implemented by the 2006 Chinese Ministry of
Commerce Measures. Although this article has commented on the possible
inadequacy of these Chinese Measures, there can be a more efficacious
mode of dispute settlement machinery for foreign investors and foreign
invested companies in India, apart from the existing mechanisms under its
revolutionary Right to Information Act of 2005 and the 2010 Guidelines
for Redress of Public Grievances.129
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See Compilation of Guidelines for Redress of Public Grievances (Dept. of
Administrative Reforms & Public Grievances, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances
& Pensions, GoI), (2010), http://goicharters.nic.in/PGR_Guideline.pdf (last visited Jul
29, 2014).; see also SINGH AND ARADHE, supra note 102 at 909–28 (discussing secrecy in
Government of India as well as right to information in India, as well as access to
information in the U.K., the U.S.A., Australia and New Zealand).
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Conclusion
	
  
This article has indulged in a comparative study of the Indian and
Chinese FDI Regimes, drawing lessons for the Indian policymakers and
offering various suggestions. However, by thoroughly critiquing some of
the relevant existing literature, this article points out the inadequacies and
lacunae in the claims and supporting arguments that are generally made to
praise Chinese FDI regime and to project it as a cause of the huge FDI into
China. On the other hand, this article discusses the somewhat unfair
assertions that are made against the Indian FDI regime by those lacking
appreciation for the constitutional and other differences in the polity of the
two countries. Sometimes, this is apparently due to the inadequate
knowledge of the Indian FDI Law and Policy, which this article criticizes
with proper reasons. However, before indulging in the said comparative
study, this article begins with an explanation of the salient aspects of
Chinese legal regime regulating FDI into China, after delineating on the
Chinese Constitution and its legal system. From the standpoint of an
Indian author, this preliminary appreciation of the Chinese foreign legal
system was much needed. Of course, the comparative study portrayed in
this article may also benefit Chinese policymakers.
******

